". . . the builder of a house has greater honor that the house iteself. For every house is built by someone, but God is the builder of everything" (Hebrews 3:3-4).

We return, now, to the final theme of the materialist's story, the mechanistic view of man himself. It is the final theme in more ways that one. Here the scientist debunks himself. Here all the grand intellectual adventure of science ends with a statement that there is no intellectual adventure. For the mind of human beings has looked into itself and seen nothing there except complex chemistry nerve impulses, and synapses firing.

That, at least, is what the materialist tells us that science has seen. However, the story is really not so simple. Here again the plot is twisted. Two of the greatest discoveries of the twentieth century cast considerable doubt upon, and some would say refute, the contention that the mind of a human being can be explained as a mere biochemical machine.

The first of these discoveries is quantum theory. In the traditional interpretation of quantum theory - sometimes called the "Copenhagen," "standard," or "orthodox" interpretation - one must, to avoid paradoxes or absurdities, posit the existence of so called "observers" who lie, at least in part, outside of the description of the world provided by physics.

That is, the mathematical formalism which quantum theory uses to make predictions about the physical world cannot be stretched to cover completely the person who is observing that world. What is it about the "observer" that lies beyond physical description? Careful analysis suggests that it is some aspect of one's rational mind.

This has led some eminent physicists to say that quantum theory is inconsistent with the materialistic view of the human mind. Eugene Wigner, a Nobel laureate in physics, stately flatly that materialism is not "logically consistent with present quantum mechanics." Sir Rudolf Peierls, another leading twentieth-century physicist, said, on the basis of the quantum theory, "The premise that you can describe in terms of physics the whole function of the human being . . . including its knowledge, and its consciousness, is untenable. There is still something missing."

Admittedly, this is a highly controversial view. That is only to be expected, especially given the materialist prejudice that affects a large part of the sientific community. Moreover, the traditional interpretation of quantum theory has aspects that many find disturbing or implausible. Some even think (wrongly, in our opinion) that the role it assigns to observers leads to subjectivism or philosophical idealism. Dissatisfaction with the traditional interpretation has led to various rival interpretations and to attempt to modify quantum theory.

However, these other ideas are equally controversial. The controversy over quantum theory will not be resolved any time soon, or perhaps never. But, even if it is not, the fact will remain that there is an argument against materialism that comes from physics itself, an argument that has been advanced and defended by some leading physicists and never refuted.

The second discovery that arguably points to something nonmaterial in a human being is a revolutionary theorem in mathematical logic proved in 1931 by the Austrian Kurt Godel, one of the greatest mathematicians of modern times. Godel's Theorem concurs the inherent limitations of what are called "formal systems." Formal systems are essentially systems of symbolic manipulation. Some computers are basically just machines for manipulations.

Godel's Theorem has great relevance to what computers and computer programs can do. It was recognized fairly quickly that Godel's Theorem might have something to say about whether the human mind is just a computer - Godel himself was firmly convinced that is is not. Indeed, he called materialism "a prejudice of our time." However, he never developed, at least in print, the argument against materialism based on his own theorem. That was first done by the Oxford philosopher John R. Lucas. In 1961, Lucas wrote:

"Godel's theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met. This I attempt to do."

Both Godel's Theorem and Lucas' argument are extremely subtle, but we can state the gist of them as follows. Godel's Theorem implies that a computer program can be outwitted by someone who understand how it is put together. Lucas observed that if a man were HIMSELF a computer program, then by knowing how his own program was put together he could outwit himself, which is a contradiction.

One may explain the Lucas argument in another way. Godel's Theorem also showed that it is beyond the power of any computer program that operates by logically consistent rules to tell that it is doing so. However, a human being, Lucas noted, CAN recognize his own consistency - at least at times - and so must be more than a mere computer.

In recent years, the eminent and mathematical physicist Sir Roger Penrose has taken up the Lucas argument, further refined it by mathematicians and philosophers. This has not quieted the criticism. However, the Godelian argument of Lucas and Penrose, though after attacked, has never been refuted.

Where does all this leave us? After all the twists and turns of scientific history, we look around and find ourselves in very familiar surroundings. We find ourselves in a universe that seems to have had a beginning . We find ourselves governed by laws that have a grandeur and sublimity that speak design. We find many indications in those laws that we were built in from the beginning.

We find that physical determinism is wrong. And we find that the deepest discoveries of modern physics and mathematics give hints, if not proof, that the mind of human beings has something about it that lies beyond the power of either physics or mathematics to describe.